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The European Union as mistake - realizations of 
European unity1 
Introduction: Churchill and Duda?  
On 9 October 2018, Andrzej Duda, current Polish President, 
was to speak in the Aula of the University of Zurich on «The Future 
of Europe – Foundations of Unity of the States of Europe». On 
19 September 1946, Sir Winston Churchill, recent British Prime 
Minister, made an appeal in the same room «Let Europe Arise!» 
What may seem like a stark contrast – in terms of personalities, 
circumstances, and above all messages – shows on closer inspection 
a fundamental similarity. 
Both leaders offered their perspective on Europe at a time when 
the European idea was/is in a deep crisis. Europe does enjoy today 
a stability, well-being and prosperity incomparable with the Conti-
nent’s a year after the Second World War. However, its unity now, 
as then, is an open, debated question, more than just geopolitically. 
The structure under which Europe can «dwell in peace, safety and 
freedom» has not been / is longer, in Churchill’s words, «generally 
and spontaneously adopted by the great majority of people in many 
lands». The «European Family», whose re-creation he called for, is 
dysfunctional, if not again broken. The present leaders of Poland 
and other European countries seek to check political action or even 
reverse existing achievements of integration. 
 
1  Relevant developments were taken into consideration and internet ad-
dresses cited were actual until 2018’s end. 
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The similar contexts and purposes of the two speeches raise 
many interesting issues. One is not that history is simply ‹repeating› 
itself some seventy years on. Instead, the iterative nature of discussions 
and proposals for European unity is itself significant. Decades of 
dramatic events on the Continent (and beyond) separate 1946 from 
2018. Above all, the existence of the EU distinguishes Churchill’s 
reality from Duda’s. The EU is a comprehensive project, pursued 
with an unprecedented and unparalleled effort, at realizing unity, 
in institutional form.  
Yet the fact alone that Duda and others are currently testing the 
foundations of unity suggests that the success of this attempt is not 
complete or even certain. The further problems that plague the EU 
today are well-known. There are a variety of ‹deficits›, ‹crises›, ‹di-
visions›, ‹threats› concerning its legitimacy, migration, Brexit and 
the Euro, respectively. In short, the EU may not be the exceptional 
instance of successful regional integration long hoped for by many; 
rather it is becoming a failed project for Europe. 
In the following essay, I reflect on the fact that the EU seems to 
be joining a long line of historical disappointments. I do so accord-
ing not to the details of given attempts but to the epistemological 
magnitude of repeated failures. How should the ongoing history of 
‹Europeanizing› Europe be understood, and what does this expe-
rience point to in the future? I believe that the development of the 
EU (and its precursors) raises not only obvious, less interesting 
first-order questions about political science, but also novel and 
intriguing second-order questions about knowledge. It is a good 
example of how in our scientific understanding we can move, in the 
terms of the present journal issue, «from error to knowledge». For 
the failure of the EU project offers important epistemological as well 
as political lessons.2 
 
2  In my analysis, I draw on literary and cultural texts or discourses. These 
offer a rich resource for explaining the projects for European unity. Their 
tropes can capture and convey aspects of human action and society that 
escape the scientific, economic or legal language typical in political dis-
cussion. 
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A historical perspective: ‹Not even past› 
The starting point of my analysis is that the way that the EU is 
commonly viewed lacks real historical perspective. For «[t]he past 
is never dead. It’s not even past».3 The past is actually present, be 
that in Dixieland or the Old World today. The prevailing thinking 
suffers from a ‹myopic epistemology›, a sort of nearsightedness in 
understanding that limits what thinkers and actors know and how 
they learn from experience. 
The EU’s birthdays are, it is true, observed in the press. Last 
year, the 60th anniversary of the signing in Rome of its founding 
treaty was the occasion for considerable stocktaking and reckon-
ings. Those dominant leave, however, much to be desired. Such 
commentary tends to consider the EU on its own terms, separate 
from its changing context. When the past is referred to, the reference 
is rarely analytical, let alone critical. The EU’s much-touted achieve-
ments should be assessed more objectively. For example, its post-
war economic growth was not, and its present prosperity is not, 
unique in global terms.4 
An alternative view of ‹the state of the union› may be taken and 
different findings made. Indeed, profound insights may be gained 
if we engage in a thorough-going, open-ended inquiry into past 
plans for a united Europe. As this text is not intended to offer a 
history lesson, I will not detail the centuries – millennia? – during 
which particular plans have been proposed, promoted and pur-
sued.5 Instead, I make general observations on these projections. 
The first insight is that there is a palpable, seemingly irresistible 
desire to unify Europe that transcends specific individuals, times 
 
3  William Faulkner: Requiem for a Nun, New York 1950, Act I Scene III.  
4  For example, political scientist Charles King describes Europe as «a 
place defined in large part by a wilful misperception of its own past». 
Charles King: States of amnesia, in: Times Literary Supplement, 21 Octo-
ber 2005, 7. 
5  European unity. The history of an idea, in: Economist, 30 December 2003. 
Further see Anthony Pagden (ed.): The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity 
to the European Union, Cambridge 2002.  
Malcolm MacLaren: The European Union as mistake 199 
and realms. Many thinkers, such as philosophers, polemicists and 
political scientists, have over the centuries eagerly drafted grands 
projets for the Continent.  
In the 14th century, Pierre Dubois, counsellor to the Duke of 
Burgundy, called already for a European federation. Immanuel 
Kant, German philosopher, made a celebrated call for «perpetual 
peace». French novelist Victor Hugo proclaimed mid-19th century 
that one day, all nations of the Continent would be «merged within 
a superior unit». One historian counted at least 600 publications in 
the Interwar proposing a united Europe.6 Unity, such thinkers have 
promised, will bring peace and subsequently, prosperity. It is to be 
realized through inclusion of all the Continent’s territory, creation 
of a common legal code, the issuance of a common currency, and 
the construction of infrastructure across the region (nota bene: each 
means being actually used by modern-day builders of Europe).  
The second insight offered by a historical review is that political 
actors, such as emperors, dictators, kings and statesmen, have tried 
variously to effect such conceptions. These conceptions have been 
rarely shared: they have been more often disputed, and in some 
cases, resisted. They have sought to reflect ‹Europe› and at other 
times, to appropriate it. 
In the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) and Paris Peace Confer-
ence (1919), Europhiles see precursors of contemporary European 
unification. These established alliances and structures of coopera-
tion among nation-states that worked through persuasion, example 
and regulation, rather than through military threats and force. 
Euroskeptics like to add that the EU has also drawn on other, less 
admirable efforts to restore the Continent’s unity, namely efforts by 
a major power like Germany to achieve hegemony by conquest and 
subjugation.7 
 
6  Perry Anderson: The New Old World, London 2009, 495. 
7  For example, British conservative commentator John Laughland sees Eu-
ropean unity today as being «tainted» by the «undemocratic origins» of 
latter-day attempts to create a new Europe. John Laughland: The Tainted 
Source. The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea, London 1997.  
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The third learning is a corollary of the two previous. Failure, 
or at least wholesale reform, of the individual project has proven 
unavoidable.8 From a historical perspective, less triumphalism and 
condescension seem called for now; the past can teach us to be 
humbler about ongoing efforts and show greater understanding for 
earlier efforts. «[T]o laugh at failed projects», a US literary scholar 
notes, «is to forget that ours, too, is a projecting age.»9 Each will 
prove futile in face of countervailing forces, as these will always be 
more powerful than the efforts in support. 
What became the EU came about from «the utter failure of the 
alternatives»10 evidenced in the preceding European Civil War. It 
may be suitably sui generis in its composition; still, the form given is 
proving to have been a mistake. The tell-tale signs are many and are 
hard to miss. National leaders shuttle constantly between capital 
cities, in and out of high-level talks, roundtables, and summits, with 
few substantial results to show for their busy-ness. The continent’s 
citizens have become disenchanted and are rejecting the policies of 
the powers-that-be, seeking alternative approaches, and turning to 
political outsiders and populist solutions. Appropriately, commen-
tators are questioning the EU’s future and developing theories of its 
disintegration.11 
Equally predictable is that if thinkers or actors don’t at first 
succeed, they will ‹try, try again›. Herein is a fourth lesson. 
 
 8  The Economist wrote upon the EU’s 50th birthday of it reflecting on its 
past «somber[ly]» and experiencing a «mid-life crisis». Leader. Europe’s 
mid-life crisis, in: Economist, 17 March 2007. Implicit in this metaphor is 
the idea that the EU is mortal. At some point, maybe after enjoying the 
‹golden years› of senescence, this incarnation of European unity too will 
decline and die. 
 9  Jason Pearl: Design for Plenty. A forgiving approach to the ideas of the 
past, in: Times Literary Supplement, 25 May 2018, 35. 
10  Ch. King: States of amnesia, 7. 
11  For example, see Philippe C. Schmitter, Zoe Lefkofridi: Neo-Functionalism 
as a Theory of Disintegration, 8 July 2015, 
 https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Pro-
files/Schmitter/Neo-F-Disintegration.final.pdf  
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The history of European integration teaches us, to paraphrase 
the scholar Lucy Inglis, that «people don’t learn from others’ mis-
takes. We have a need to make our own.»12 Rather than checking 
and verifying the sense behind these efforts, they continue to pur-
sue such projects.  
Today, we see Europhiles, driven by ideals and ambition, dou-
bling down on European integration: ‹crises offer opportunities›. In 
his last state of the union speech, Jean-Claude Junker, current EU 
Commission President, urged renewed efforts to integrate.13 For 
their part, think tanks are diligently drawing up new schemes out 
of contemporary crises «to take the European project to the next 
level».14 The Europhiles are convinced of the righteousness of their 
cause and blame not countervailing forces but self-serving critics 
for undermining their noble efforts.  
A final observation raises a fundamental question, pregnant 
with significance. In the iterative process just described, is progress 
being made?  
Every project is premised on a consequent improvement in the 
European condition. Indeed, Europhiles discern in the develop-
ment of European unity a natural historical progression. The story 
is a subjective interpretation of continuous and considerable im-
provement, as captured in the designation of the change process as 
‹evolution›. In Europe, so this Whiggish narrative, «‹things are 
pretty good, they’re going to get better›».15  
 
12  On the Spot: Lucy Inglis (Interview), in: History Today 68, 8 August 2018, 
https://www.historytoday.com/history-today/spot-lucy-inglis  
13  See https://ec.europa.eu/germany/news/20180912-lage-der-union-
2018-stunde-der-europaeischen-souveraenitaet_de  
14  «Europe in the 21st century: a new version is available», a call by young 
activists on Open Democracy, 
 https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/ulrike-guerot-
victoria-kupsch/story-of-europe-in-21st-century-new-version-of-eu-
rope-is-available  
15  Further see: «[t]he European myth goes something like this: ‹European 
nations are old; European nations are wise; European nations learned 
from the second world war that war was a bad thing and therefore coop-
erate economically to form this thing called the European Union›». 
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Reference to the fate of the last great leap forward [sic] should 
certainly give Europhiles pause. The constitutional convention of 
2001-03 represents an important and telling political juncture in the 
EU’s development. It caused great confusion, controversy and con-
flict; the draft constitution ended up ‹in the bin›, and a return was 
hastily made to politics-as-usual, that is to the «[a]mbiguities, illu-
sions and intentionally blurred visions»16 that characterize the 
European project today. Without being a Euroskeptic, one can con-
clude that historical progress, assumed to be a real concept leading 
over time to an improvement of the world, is neither linear nor 
steady and that it is at best asymptotic, never actually reaching the 
desired endpoint.17  
Constituting the polity: ‹Reflection and choice› or ‹accident 
and force›?  
As I have argued, the EU is the latest in a long line of failed 
attempts at European unity. Why then is the attempt repeatedly 
made – try, try again? One explanation lies close at hand, without 
making charges of megalomania, professions of European brother-
hood, or allusions to technocratic presumptuousness. 
This is based on objective need, be that political, economic, social 
or otherwise. Europe is ‹cramped›, a relatively small and narrow 
space housing many persons and different nations. These cannot 
pursue their destinies in isolation and constant rivalry, and they 
 
Timothy Snyder: Political outrage. Why all sides get it wrong about the 
arc of history, in: Big Think, 8 September 2018, 
 https://bigthink.com/videos/timothy-snyder-political-outrage-why-
all-sides-get-it-wrong-about-the-arc-of-history  
16  Michael Pinto-Duschinsky: All in the translation, in: Times Literary Sup-
plement, 13 June 2003, 3. 
17  An alternative but plausible interpretation of developments and trajecto-
ries would deny meliorism outright: seen with distance and objectivity, 
history has no shape or pattern, let alone an ‹arc› (following T. Snyder: 
Political outrage). 
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must therefore cooperate or more, collaborate. Put in poli-sci speak, 
efforts at regional integration are motivated by the desires to realize 
«mutual gains from cooperation in policy arenas characterized by 
high levels of functional interdependence»18 as well as to create and 
preserve ‹positive peace›. Put in everyday speech, if an EU didn’t 
exist, someone would have to propose one. However motivated, a 
will to order - and belief in societal malleability, depending on 
scheme - is always at hand among elites in Europe. It crystallizes in 
certain constellations, that is at particular moments, among particu-
lar leaders, and in particular forms. 
Considered more abstractly, the historical experience of the EU 
and its precursors offers insights into the process of ‹constituting a 
polity›. Each project is attempting to form and to formalize (consti-
tute) a people and a political system (polity). Whereas in Western 
Europe, polities have usually been the products of hegemonic civic 
nationalism and historical trends, unifying Europe today is a matter 
of intergroup aspiration and collaboration.  
This situation confirms the diagnosis of Alexander Hamilton, 
US founding father, that at issue when an old regime dissolves and 
a new regime is established is «whether societies of men are really 
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and 
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their po-
litical constitutions on accident and force.»19 Thinkers have eagerly 
taken up this challenge, seeking to design and drawing up blue-
prints for a new Europe. Germans like Dieter Grimm, Jürgen Haber-
mas and Fritz Scharpf have keenly debated the existence or possible 
construction of a European demos. Is there nascent – can there be 
fostered constitutionally – a Volk-like community at the European 
level, as at the national?20 
 
18  Ph. C. Schmitter, Z. Lefkofridi: Neo-Functionalism as a Theory of Disinte-
gration, 4. 
19  Alexander Hamilton: Federalist No. 1, in: Ralph H. Gabriel (ed.): Hamil-
ton, Madison and Jay on the Constitution. Selections from the Federalist 
Papers, New York 1954, 3. 
20  Their work received special impetus in 1994 from the German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s Maastricht judgment, which postulated the ‹no 
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This focus, I believe, is misplaced: it should rather be on the 
‹polity› in its alternate sense, that of a polis / political or governmen-
tal organization (including administration). The prospects for Euro-
pean unity depend ultimately on the ability of thinkers and actors 
to find a fitting form, to build – in more familiar terms – a ‹state› 
and not a ‹nation›. Arrangements, bodies, policies etc. must be 
crafted to manage the public and civil affairs concerned, but to date 
an evident form for what Europe ‹is› is lacking.21  
The question presents itself whether Europe can be captured 
and controlled through our reflection and choice? Are thinkers and 
actors, through awareness and assessment of its situation, capable 
of identifying, devising - and then agreeing on - the provisions for 
«good government» in Europe, which could facilitate progress 
toward peace and prosperity etc., now and in the future? To put it 
in epistemological terms, supposing that the final form that would 
be suitable to the challenge of constituting the European polity does 
exist, are we up to the task of finding it?  
Some contextuality: The mess we’re in 
The leading reason for the reality that I have described - that is 
the iterative process and not a lasting outcome or successive attempts 
at unification rather than a final achievement of unity - has not been 
fully recognized among the thinkers, let alone acknowledged by the 
actors, concerned. It may be found in the inescapably contextual 
nature of efforts at European unity. We should accordingly talk in 
terms of contingency and change regarding the causes and con-
sequences of developments in Europe. 
 
demos thesis›. Inter alia see Jan-Werner Müller: Für Brüssel sterben? 
Europa und der Verfassungspatriotismus, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
5 December 2003. 
21  Generally see Neil Walker: The Shifting Foundations of the European 
Union Constitution, in: Denis J. Galligan, Mila Versteeg (eds.): Social and 
Political Foundations of Constitutions, Cambridge 2013, 637-660. 
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There may well be other reasons for the failures hitherto to 
complete the projects proposed and pursued. I am not, for example, 
contending that an evident and bounded European people exists. 
The impossibility of demarcating Europe as a space also poses 
undeniable problems.22 Yet most significant is that each attempt is 
contingent on the time, place and Zeitgeist in which the project is 
conceived and/or launched. (For example, what was appropriate 
for post-war Europe is no longer appropriate today. With NATO, 
armed conflict between members seems unimaginable today; with 
the single market, economic barriers no longer divide Europe’s 
countries.) 
The accelerated pace of change symptomatic of contemporary 
life has only heightened the impact of contextuality on policy-
making. We live in an ‹age of disruption›, in a time of political 
surprises, economic uncertainty, social upheaval, cultural volatility, 
popular lability. News breaks in a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week long 
cycle, and unexpected, shocking events pile up on top of each other, 
faster than we can process them. (Who foresaw clearly the global 
financial crisis of 2008, the war in the Ukraine from 2014, the migra-
tion ‹flood› in 2015, the Brexit referendum result of 2016, or the 
current risk of Italy being forced out of the Eurozone, to cite a few 
developments?23) The decisiveness of context is amplified by the 
fact that the EU is subject to factors, influences etc. from inside and 
from outside the union24 that, changing so often and so markedly, 
cannot be predicted, let alone determined, by Europhiles. In short, 
how the EU got into its present ‹state› may be seen; where it goes 
now is not visible. 
 
22  Further see Daniel Innerarity: The Political Innovation of the European 
Union, in: Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto 48 (2013) 56-58. 
23  Generally see Rudolph Lohmeyer, Erik R. Peterson, Paul A. Laudicina: 
No One Saw It Coming, in: ATKearney, March 2017, 
 https://www.atkearney.com/web/global-business-policy-council/arti-
cle?/a/no-one-saw-it-coming  
24  Europe is militarily, economically and demographically highly exposed 
to other countries by virtue of its geography - qua location, resources and 
neighbors.  
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The frequency, complexity and unresolved nature of the con-
comitant challenges facing Europe today should indicate the 
magnitude of what is involved in pursuing European unity and not 
the alleged incompetence of European leaders. Multiplicity and 
confusion confront and challenge our societies. Attempting to order, 
structure, tame, the unruliness that characterizes Europe is akin to 
nailing jelly on a wall. It is to do something very difficult or impos-
sible, something even silly to attempt. One must realize in advance 
that pursuing European unity through projects such as the EU 
means «submitting to chaos and nevertheless retaining faith in order 
and meaning».25 
How might Europe be ‹projected›? 
Given the multifaceted and mutating context, projects for Euro-
pean unity will be – have to be – commensurably messy. The task 
of the thinkers and actors concerned is no longer to avoid the mess 
but to find the forms that accommodate it.26 The projects should 
try to express the raw material, reacting thereby to contemporary 
political, economic, cultural etc. developments continually and 
rapidly. The rules, institutions etc. can be amenable to change them-
selves and be reformed at frequent intervals if these are to remain 
relevant and effective, that is adapted to maintain the same regula-
tory pressure and to achieve the same outcome - if nothing more.27 
As the old axiom has it, sometimes everything has to change, if 
 
25  Hermann Hesse: The Glass Bead Game (Magister Ludi), trans. Richard 
and Clara Winston, New York 1969, 169. 
26  Paraphrasing Samuel Beckett, quoted in Tom F. Driver: Beckett by the 
Madeleine, in: Lawrence Graver, Raymond Federman (eds.): Samuel 
Beckett. The Critical Heritage, Abingdon 1997, 219. 
27  Pointedly see: «Europa muss in seiner Organisation so findig sein wie das 
Leben selbst.» Adolf Muschg: ‹Kerneuropa›. Gedanken zur europäischen 
Identität, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 31 May 2003. 
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things are to stay the same.28 A deliberate decision can be taken in 
favor of ongoing reform and revival over stagnation and decay. 
As first the European Coal and Steel Community, the European 
Economic Community, the European Community, and now the 
European Union, the latest project for unity in Europe, has already 
successively expanded its competences and intruded into increas-
ingly sensitive areas of national policy-making. The EU may well 
have to change markedly, fundamentally. Its powers, structures 
and policies will have to be reformed inter alia to handle the massive 
population movements today, to fill the gap of US military with-
drawal, and to share fiscal risk to secure its economic foundation. 
(The Economist, for its part, looks mischievously to the past for the 
way forward. It has advocated using the Holy Roman Empire as a 
model for «European disunion done right», arguing that the Empire 
offers «surprising lessons for the EU today».29) 
What needs to be done? 
Supporters of European unity would be wise to consider care-
fully their ‹reach› and their ‹grasp›, and the relation of the two.30 
The aim itself of European unity - and the creation of a peaceable, 
liberal, law-based and generous great power31 - may be overly 
ambitious, greater than what can be realistically achieved. 
 
28  Following Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa: The Leopard, trans. Archi-
bald Colquhoun, New York 1960, 40. 
29  See eponymous article in: Economist, 22 December 2012. Generally see 
Peter H. Wilson: The Holy Roman Empire. A thousand years of Europe’s 
history, London 2016. 
30  Cf. «Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, / Or what’s a heaven 
for?» Robert Browning: Andrea del Sarto, lines 97-98 in: M. H. Abrams 
et al. (eds.): Norton Anthology of English Literature, New York 51986, II 
1274. 
31  In contrast (if not opposition) to the Soviet Union/Russia, China and 
most recently, the US. 
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The commonly-used metaphor about man’s reach exceeding 
his grasp is ambivalent. On the one hand [sic], it can be understood 
as an encouragement: not to settle, but to yearn, strive, and take 
‹chances›, for it is through dreaming big and pushing ourselves 
to the limits that we excel. This understanding accords with the 
Enlightenment notions that have hitherto informed projects for 
European unity. These have been premised on the potential of 
social engineering as well as on ideals of liberalism, secularism, 
individualism etc. Europhiles, led by a transnational educated 
intelligentsia, bring to their work «faith in the power of our minds 
and our methods to order reality».32 On the other hand, the poetic 
appeal can be understood as an admonition, namely that we should 
be wary of overestimating our capabilities, of overreaching. Indeed, 
the same notions have led many in recent times to assume mis-
takenly that events, developments, relations etc. are readily sub-
sumable to legal rules and political edicts. These notions are, as 
explained, questionable, and they bring, like political construc-
tivism generally, considerable risks and grave consequences upon 
their failure. (Consider the setback to the cause of unification from 
the popular rejection of the Constitutional Treaty.) 
Between encouragement and admonition, a compromise atti-
tude is conceivable. Reference here may be usefully made to mod-
ernist notions. The only remaining ‹solution› to the challenge of 
European unification is to continue to attempt to rethink and rework 
the European project, whatever the prospect of success. We cannot 
but persist in acting – if only due to functional imperatives. Yet we 
should not hope for the fulfilment of our aims. The sought-for unity 
will never be realized, but the incidence of nationalism, the depth 
of division, the number of barriers etc. on the Continent might be 
reduced. Samuel Beckett’s ironic advice is worth heeding in this 
regard: «Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. 
Fail better.»33 
 
32  H. Hesse: The Glass Bead Game, 169. 
33  Samuel Beckett: Worstward Ho, New York 1983, 7.  
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What is to be expected? 
The future is indeterminate and offers a spectrum of possibili-
ties. If my preceding diagnosis is correct, however, the making of 
real, substantial progress should not be expected. The story of Eu-
ropean integration is not over, but the dominant progress narrative 
reveals observers’ own preference and teleological interpretation 
more than any underlying reality. Indeed, regress is conceivable 
and has been evidenced in political and economic (dis-)integration 
in other world regions.  
There is an old saying in Brussels that times of crisis present 
opportunities and that it is then that the European project advances. 
More accurate would be to say that ‹Europe is the sum of the solu-
tions› – tout court.34 Crisis in the project enables reform that brings 
change; it does not ensure greater integration. Therefore, it is likely 
that the contemporary reform efforts will just manage. They will 
‹muddle through›: they will achieve the minimum in keeping with 
exigencies (regional cooperation, global threats), and their achieve-
ments will be provisional until the next disruption. 
From such a perspective, the much-criticized tendency of Eu-
ropean leaders at their meetings to reach agreement merely to push 
contentious issues down the road for resolution at the next meeting - 
be it in hope that the situation takes an auspicious turn, that some-
one will come up with a better idea, or that a compromise may be 
found to paper over differences - takes on a new aspect and has a 
plausible justification. Likewise, the much-mocked aim of an «ever 
closer union»,35 which defines a journey rather than a destination, 
might be viewed more sympathetically.  
 
34  Following EU founding father Jean Monnet who wrote that «Europe will 
be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those 
crises». Cited by European Commission President José Barroso in: A 
Europe for All Weathers, 30 November 2011, 
 europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-838_en.doc 
35  The phrase appeared in the first clause of the preamble to the founding 
Treaty of Rome 1957 and is now found in Art. 6(1), Treaty on European 
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Conclusion: ‹This is where the home truth ends›36 
The way in which European unification, that is the emergence, 
development, and prospects of projects, is commonly viewed is 
distorted by a myopic epistemology. This epistemology lacks real 
historical perspective and has hindered observers in perceiving and 
understanding the European situation. My intent here has been to 
raise awareness of it, show its effects and diminish its harm to our 
discourse.  
In order to develop corrective lenses for greater clarity, I have 
told some true but unpleasant facts about projects for European 
unity. The fundamental ‹home truth› is that there have been many 
attempts at constituting the polity but no complete realizations – at 
most only partial, provisional victories. When one considers this 
history, I believe that the only ‹realization› that has been / can be 
reached is epistemological. The EU is namely another mistake or 
‹error› in attempts at unifying Europe. Simultaneously, this per-
spective suggests that from big mistakes can come ‹knowledge›, if 
the right lessons are learned.37 
A leading lesson is that no such projects for European unity are 
realizable. The political and legal forms that might be suitable to the 
challenge exceed our cognitive grasp. Invariably, the best-laid plans 
of European statesmen and -women have gone – and will go – awry, 
leaving us with grief and pain, for promised joy.38 (Perhaps the 
trauma for Europhiles of the constitutional referenda is the best 
example of this failure and disappointment.) 
One last lesson may be drawn from the history of projects for 
European unity. It is noteworthy that each failed attempt at con-
 
Union: «DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe». 
36  Elvis Costello: «Home Truth», from Goodbye Cruel World, 1984. 
37  See fundamental premise of conception of the present journal issue. 
38  Robert Burns: To a Mouse, 1785, lines 37-40: «But Mousie, thou are no 
thy lane, / In proving foresight may be vain: / The best laid schemes o’ 
mice an’ men, / Gang aft a-gley, / An’ lea’e us nought but grief an’ pain, / 
For promised joy!» in: M. H. Abrams: Norton Anthology, II 92.  
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stituting the polity has been an accelerated elite effort in which law 
is intended to determine the facts on ground, rather than vice versa. 
I ask myself whether it would be wiser, more advantageous for the 
cause of ‹good government› in the region to simply facilitate ‹acci-
dent›? In 18th-century usage, ‹accident› meant organic development. 
Might the manifestations and impetuses of everyday mass interac-
tion prove more effective and enduring in realizing integration – 
and ultimately unity – than the projects (qua rules and edicts) of 
leaders in past? These are conceivably prerequisites for concerted 
action leading to lasting political change and binding agreements in 
Europe. 
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